Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
Research Affiliate in Industrial Organization
Center for Economic Policy and Research Development (CEPR)
Phone: (908) 432-7889
I study various topics in microeconomics with a focus on models of information, including learning models where individuals have information-processing biases, and how information influences equilibrium payoffs and behavior in dynamic games. I also work on questions related to discrimination, the optimal design of experiments and contracting, with applications to designing ratings systems and structuring online labor markets.
Publications & Working Papers
- "Informational Herding with Model Misspecification." Journal of Economic Theory (2016).
- "Optimal Design of Experiments in the Presence of Interference," with S. Baird, C. McIntosh and B. Ozler. Accepted at Review of Economics & Statistics (2017).
Design software (cited below)
- "The Language of Discrimination: Using Experimental versus Observational Data," with A. Imas and M. Rosenberg. In preparation for the American Economic Association (Papers & Proceedings) (2018).
- "Bounded Rationality and Learning: A Framework and a Robustness Result," with D. Hauser. R&R at Econometrica, (2017).
- "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem." R&R at Theoretical Economics, (2016).
- "The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence," with A. Imas and M. Rosenberg, (2017).
- "Optimal Contracting with Costly State Verification, with an Application to Crowdsourcing," with T. Kravitz, (2016).
- "Collective Search with Private Information," with S.N. Ali.
Work in Progress
- "Information Design in Misspecified Learning Models," with D. Hauser. (extended abstract)
- "Mediated Persistence."
A. Bohren, P. Staples, S. Baird, C. McIntosh and B. Ozler, (2016). Power Calculation Software for Randomized Saturation Experiments, Version 1.0. Available from http://pdel.ucsd.edu/solutions/index.html
Environments: R, Python, Matlab, Graphical User Interface (GUI)